Abstract This paper examines the extent to which borrowing constraints restrict …rm access to credit and identi…es individual, …rm, and loan characteristics, which determine the cost of capital in Vietnamese manufacturing. Using direct information from a Vietnamese enterprise survey I show that 14 percent of the enterprises are credit constrained, and these enterprises would increase their debt holdings by 34 percent if borrowing constraints were relaxed. Moreover, it emerges that informal credit markets play an important role for fast growing …rms. Enterprises do not appear to have the necessary time to go through the many administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if they want to "seize the day". Finally, collateralized loans face larger interest rates, explained by the signi…cant in ‡uence of "policy lending" in Vietnamese credit markets.
Introduction
A former Vietnamese Secretary General once stated that Vietnam has, in principle, three problems related to future economic development: "Capital, capital and capital" (see MPDF ,1997 ). According to a recent survey by MPDF (1997) the private small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) share this view in the sence that they perceive their main obstacles to growth as "Credit, credit and credit". In the early 1990s concern among donors and Vietnamese o¢ cials about the malfunctioning of …nancial markets gave rise to the promotion and establishment of formal credit institutions targeted at the poor. Moreover, the government announced that policy-induced lending by State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), primarily to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), would be phased out. However, the SOCBs continued to serve mainly the SOEs, and doubt regarding the ability of public banks and the …nancial system in general to ful…l the growing demand for credit from the fast growing private sector emerged.
Previous studies on credit constraints have due to lack of direct measures of credit constraints typically identi…ed unconstrained …rms by dividing the sample under consideration according to the ratio of …nancial assets to the market value of the …rm (Fazzari et al., 1988) . 1 In this paper a more direct approach is applied.
I categorize …rms as being credit constrained based on replies to direct questions about whether the …rm applied for credit and if they applied whether they were denied access. I then use information for the non-constrained …rms to get an estimate of actual debt demand, and use this estimate to measure desired debt for constrained …rms, based on observed individual …rm speci…c characteristics. This paper therefore has two main objectives. First, using a Vietnamese enterprise survey conducted in 2002 I identify credit constrained SMEs directly, determine whether there exists a gap between desired debt and observed debt, and establish an estimate of the magnitude of borrowing constraints. Second, I use information on credit access and interest rates to identify determinants of credit access and the cost of capital facing Vietnamese SMEs.
Credit constraints and establishing the magnitude hereof have important policy implications. Di¤erences in the cost of internal and external …nancing can in ‡uence the way in which the e¤ects of …scal policy and monetary policy are perceived. As summarized in Hubbard (1998) contractionary monetary policy raises the cost of external …nancing relatively more for constrained …rms, both in terms of higher interest rates and as a larger spread between internal and external funds. Consequently, investment tends to be lower, than in unconstrained …rms. Moreover, identifying characteristics of credit constrained …rms can help policy makers to target …rms which are more likely to face binding credit constraints, such as young non-household …rms.
The main results are that only 14 percent of Vietnamese SMEs are credit constrained, and these enterprises would increase their debt holdings 34 percent if borrowing constraints were relaxed. The data furthermore suggest that larger …rms have access to cheaper credit, and although male entrepreneurs obtain credit more frequently, there seems to be no discrimination against women. The probability of accessing credit is higher in rural areas, but rural …rms at the same time experience larger credit constraints, indicating that demand for external funds is signi…-cantly higher in rural areas than in the three larger urban cities, Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), Hanoi and Haiphong. Moreover, non-household enterprises often face larger credit constraints, suggesting that a shift in the present policy focus from the smaller household …rms towards supporting larger private and limited liability companies maybe justi…ed. Finally, borrower-lender relationships reduce interest rates, suggesting that relationship lending provides important information about borrower quality in the segmented Vietnamese credit market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identi…es the characteristics of credit constrained SMEs in Vietnam and estimates the magnitude of these constraints. Section 3 put focus on the …rms, which get access to credit, and examines the empirical determinants of credit availability and the interest rate on the most recent loan. Section 4 concludes.
Identifying credit constrained …rms
Most of the empirical literature concerning …rm credit constraints focuses on either q-models of investment or on an Euler equation approach (for excellent overviews see Hubbard, 1998 and Schiantarelli, 1996) . As an example, the latter approach relies on 
Data
The data were generated in an enterprise survey conducted in 2002, gathering in- Private enterprises (39 percent), co-operatives (7 percent), limited companies (37 percent), joint-stock companies (4 percent) and foreign invested …rms (4 percent).
For reasons of implementation the survey was con…ned to speci…c areas in each province/city. After data cleaning 1119 entries survived. Table 1 it can be seen that …rms holding debt are often larger and grow faster than non-debt holders. Debt holders are often relatively young …rms, and older …rms are often on average less credit constrained than their younger counterparts.
Another group of variables includes characteristics of the owner. Enterprises are primarily owned by men (77.8 percent). 4 Male owned …rms are more likely to hold debt, but on average there seems to be no gender discrimination in credit markets. Relatively more men are credit constrained. Regarding measures of the level of human capital, I combined information on average educational level of the enterprise owner and data on whether the owner had any longer-term formal or informal experience prior to establishing the …rm. On this basis, skills were categorized as high, medium or low, 5 and it appears that a relatively large part of the low skilled owners are debt holders. Regarding credit constraints there does not seem to be much di¤erence between constrained and unconstrained groups in terms of educational level. and share holding companies are relatively more credit constrained than household …rms, as shown by the drop in the share from the total sample in column 1 to the unconstrained sample in column 3. Moreover, the proportion of household enterprises is lower in the debt holders group than in the entire sample. Finally, it seems as if reinvested pro…t is still a major source of …rm …nancing in Vietnam,
given the relative low debt to assets share (8.7 percent).
Empirical model
Joint analysis of the desired level of debt and credit constrained …rms can be performed using a two step sample selection model, which has only been used in analysing credit constrained households in the US (see Cox and Jappelli, 1993, and Duca and Rosenthal, 1993) . In this approch it is recorded whether enterprises with positive debt holdings are credit constrained and conditional on being a credit constrained …rm, holding positive debt, I estimate the desired level of debt of the individual …rm. Assume that the desired level of debt to assets ratio, d, for …rm i, is a linear function of a vector of observables x 1i .
where " 1i is a random component for …rm i. The underlying estimation problem is that the desired debt to asset share for …rm i (described by d i ) is only observed if the demand for debt is positive (b i = 1) and the …rm is not credit constrained
. A direct estimate of equation 1 is therefore likely to be biased, if the variables which determine whether a …rm is credit constrained or has debt also a¤ect the level of desired debt. Given that some …rms prefer not to hold debt, equation 2 controls for the fact that debt holdings are truncated from below by zero.
where b i is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if the …rm holds positive debt, x 2i contains proxies for the convenience of having debt, and " 2i is a …rm speci…c error term.
Direct measures of credit constraints have generally not been available in previous studies, and Jappelli (1990) show that the indirect proxies used often generate large errors when classifying unconstrained individuals. This highlight the advantages of identifying directly whether or not a …rm is credit constrained as done in the present study. The underlying latent variable credit constraint model is given by equation 3
where n i is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if the …rm is nonconstrained, x 3i is a vector of credit constraint proxies, and " 3i is a random error term for …rm i.
The inverse Mills ratios from the estimates of equations 2 and 3 are used to correct for selection bias, ensuring consistent estimates of the debt demand in equation
Following Cox and Jappelli (1993) I assume that the error terms are normally distributed with mean zero and variance 1 ; 2 and 3 , respectively. I also use the standard probit normalization ( 2 = 3 = 1) to obtain consistent estimates of 2 and 3 . Estimating debt demand therefore boils down to
are the inverse Mill's ratios, and ( ) and F ( ) are the probability and cumulative distribution function, respectively.
Credit demand and constraints
A reduced form …rm debt demand function can be estimated using only unconstrained …rms that hold positive debt. Table 2 presents the regressions for being unconstrained and for holding positive debt, respectively. It is clear that the probability of being unconstrained is larger in the urban areas HCMC, Hanoi and Haiphong than in the rural provinces of Ha Tay, Long An, Phu Tho and Quang Nam. This is in accordance with Van de Walle and Cratty (2004), who state that post-reform government policies in terms of access to credit has tended to favour urban areas. Furthermore, private …rms as well as limited and share holding companies are less likely to be unconstrained. This is contrary to the general perception that …nancing constraints are more binding for smaller …rms, which have a higher probability of going bankrupt (the positive relationship between size and survival). 6 Results from the estimation of the debt incidence equation indicate that the probability of holding debt increases with revenue earnings. Moreover, holding debt is negatively related to age. Older …rms are often more settled and less likely to engage in activities that require capital demanding initiatives, which is in accordance with …ndings that older …rm are less innovative. Higher levels of education reduce the probability of having positive debt. This …nding is somewhat surprising given the expectation that higher education should a¤ect investment possibilities and thereby increase the probability of holding debt. Table 3 report results for both the unadjusted generalized tobit estimation and the debt equation corrected for the two sources of selection bias (column 2 and 3 are without and with exclusion restrictions, respectively). Total assets and revenue earnings exert opposing e¤ects on the demand for debt, where increasing assets lower the desired debt share by around 3-4 percent, and larger revenue earnings increase desired debt share by approximately 8 percent. In the unadjusted case age comes out insigni…cant, however adjusting for the selection bias it turns out that older …rms have lower demand for debt than their younger counterparts. A 12 Probit estimates, marginal e¤ects. *, **, *** indicate signi…cance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household enterprise. All regressions included a constant term. The probit for holding debt and the probit for being unconstrained may have correlated errors. A bi-variate probit was therefore estimated. The correlation between the errors in the two equations was not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, so estimation proceeded, treating the two equations as independent selection criteria.
plausible explanation is that …rms over the lifecycle increase the probability of self-…nancing and over time get less innovative, thereby reducing their demand for external funds. Moreover, the negative gender e¤ect in the unadjusted equation disappears when including the two selection terms. This …nding, combined with the results in Table 2 , suggests that there is no direct discrimination against women in Vietnamese credit markets. This is contrary to the …ndings in Fafchamps (2000) for the manufacturing sector in the African region where a gender bias is found, 
The credit gap
The credit gap can be de…ned as the di¤erence between the average desired level *, **, *** indicate signi…cance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household enterprise. All regressions included a constant term. Estimates in column 3 are based on Mills ratios calculated using estimates where revenue growth is excluded in the debt incidence equation, and log revenue is excluded in the unconstrained equation.
where f c is the number of constrained …rms, and f uc is the number of unconstrained …rms, so f = f c + f uc . The vector x c contains the means of observables for the constrained …rms, and^ 1 is the estimate of 1 taken from Table 3 . The average desired debt to asset share was estimated to be 34 percent larger than the actual debt to asset share for constrained Vietnamese …rms. These results indicate that even though rejected applicants and discouraged borrowers amount to only 14 percent of the sample, Vietnamese SMEs would acquire on average 7 percent more debt if credit constraints were removed.
The cost of capital
In this section I take the analysis one step further and focus on the group that at some point in time were able to obtain credit from either formal or informal sources. Table 4 gives an overview of enterprises having accessed credit even though McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999a) where the informal credit system and trade credits play the most important role in supplying credit to SMEs. 9 The four largest SOCBs are The Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Industry and Commerce Bank of Vietnam (Incombank), Foreign Trade Bank of Vietnam (Vietcombank) and the Vietnamese Bank for Investment and Development (VBID). These are the leading banks in the banking system with more than 230 branches in all cities and provinces in Vietnam. In 1999 the outstanding loan volume of the four SOCBs accounted for 73 per cent of all loans in the economy (Kovsted et al., 2004) . Among the SOCBs it is mainly Vietcombank and VBARD that have an extensive branch network at the district and village levels. They are therefore the main lenders to private enterprises. involve time-consuming procedures in ful…lling applications and other administrative di¢ culties that slow down the loan approval processes. Firms which experience increased demand for their products and wish to expand production may not have the time to go through administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if they want to "seize the day". It is therefore possible that private moneylenders make fast growing …rms able to meet increasing demand.
Interest rate diversity in the formal credit market is also observed. Private and government banks charge on average the highest interest rates (monthly rates between 0.9-1.1 percent, on average) in the formal market, and in order to obtain a loan from either of these two sources the …rms are often required to o¤er collateral (over 80 percent of the loans are collateralized). However, on average government banks o¤er larger loans than can be obtained in informal credit markets. In our sample, …rms that obtain loans from private banks are characterized by being male owned, with low skill, and operating a household enterprise in rural areas. This also explains why the average loan amount from private banks in our sample is relatively small. Government credit programmes are characterized by o¤ering relatively small loans (often to household enterprises), but at a low interest rate and often without collateral requirements. Loans from other enterprises can in many cases be seen as a form of inter…rm trade credit, which is often characterized by relatively low rates of interest and collateral requirements. Moreover, the loans obtained are relatively large, and in 94 percent of the cases the borrower has prior relations with the creditor. 10 This is in accordance with McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999b), who
show that inter…rm relationships are associated with larger credit, at a rate that diminishes with time. However, this form of inter…rm credit relationships is more common among private enterprises, cooperatives, and limited and share-holding companies as compared to household SMEs. Table 6 presents the results from analysing the determinants of credit access. Column 1 contains the full sample, whereas column 2 and 3 only consider constrained and non-constrained enterprises, respectively. As described above a total of 537 enterprises accessed credit out of the 1119 sampled.
Credit access and determinants of loan rates
Consistent with previous studies for both developed (Uzzi, 1999 ) and developing countries (Bigsten et al., 2003) I …nd that …rms are more likely to access credit if they are larger in terms of total real revenue. Moreover, the probability of accessing credit appears to be negatively related to …rm age. This probably re ‡ects that older …rms …nance investments using accumulated pro…ts to a larger extent.
Turning to speci…c owner characteristics it appears that male owned …rms obtain credit more frequently than female owned …rms. Moreover, looking at the constrained sample the male entrepreneur is to a larger extent able to get access to external funds as compared to his female counterpart. Education seems to play an important role in the credit allocation process. The negative correlations between being high or medium skilled and accessing credit might re ‡ect that owners with 10 The relationship dummy takes on a value of one if the …rm has borrowed from the creditor before and zero otherwise. higher educational levels have lower demand for credit or that better educated owners are more likely to know when their application will be rejected and therefore refrain from applying.
Looking at …rm characteristics it is clear that location is of signi…cant importance in determining access to credit. In our sample the probability of accessing credit is higher in rural (Hatay, Long An, Phu Tho and Quang Nam) than in urban areas (HCMC, Hanoi, Haiphong). In previous sections I noted that the demand for credit is higher in rural areas and although rural areas also experience larger credit constraints, it seems as if some part of the credit demand in rural areas is successfully ful…lled. Moreover, most of government bank credit is allocated towards rural areas (not reported) con…rming that local governments often are distinctly protective of …rms in rural areas, which are more oriented towards serving local markets and therefore tend to escape some of the credit barriers inherent in larger, possibly more outward oriented markets. The ownership legal structure does not seem to be an important determinant for credit access in Vietnam. Only in the case of the non-constrained sample (column 3) is there an indication of limited liability and share-holding companies experiencing signi…cantly higher access to credit than the smaller household enterprises.
Regressions that explain the variation in the interest rate quoted on the most recent loan are reported in Table 7 . First, …rms holding debt pay larger interest on current loans. However, when controlling for loan speci…c characteristics this e¤ect disappears. Consistent with other studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , for the US), there is a statistically signi…cant indication of …rm size (measured by total assets) being negatively related to the cost of capital, but measured in terms of real revenue a positive e¤ect emerges. The average combined e¤ect of these two measures of size is negative. That is, larger …rms get cheaper credit, which corresponds well with the results obtained in Uzzi (1999) for U.S. non-agricultural SMEs. Firm age does not seem to play a signi…cant role as a determinant of cost of capital, which is contrary to the …ndings in Petersen and Rajan (1994) . 11 Firms reputation measured by 11 Squared terms were included, but gave no statistically signi…cant outcome. the age of the …rm therefore does not seem to in ‡uence the interest rates facing Vietnamese SMEs.
Turning to column 2 in Table 7 , the size of the loan has a positive in ‡uence on the interest paid. However, this e¤ect does not hold when controlling for source (column 3). Contrary to results normally found in the literature collateral is positively correlated with interest rates. 12 Explanations for this result may be found in the somewhat adverse lending criteria facing the State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) in Vietnam. Although the government has announced that policy-induced lending is being phased out, "policy lending" has remained a de…ning characteristic of the SOCBs (Kovsted et al., 2004) . Other loan criteria than economic ones may therefore have a signi…cant in ‡uence when evaluating loan applications and 12 Analyzing the sub-sample where only strictly positive interest is charged does not change the overall picture reported in Table 5 given that government banks provide a major share of the credit the normal picture between collateral and interest rates may well be distorted. Table 8 gives an indication of the above argument. Looking strictly at private banks, larger loan amounts and loans based on collateral are charged with signi…cantly lower interest rates, as found in most of the related literature. Government banks charge signi…cantly higher interest rates on collateralized loans, indicating that government banks may use other/di¤erent criteria for determining interest rates.
As could be expected from the summary statistics in Table 4 a positive signi…-cant e¤ect on the cost of capital exists when borrowing from private moneylenders, but also when borrowing from private banks as compared to loans obtained from government banks. Relatives, friends, other enterprises and government credit programmes charge signi…cantly lower interest rates than government banks. Finally, from Table 7 it is clear that …rms which have borrowed from the creditor before (Relationship), and have built up some kind of business relationship are faced with signi…cantly lower costs of capital. This result is consistent with …ndings from the US (Berger and Udell, 1995, and Uzzi, 1999) where …rms with longer banking relationships borrow at lower rates. However, note from Table 8 (in the case of private banks) that relationship lending is associated with larger interest rates.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was two fold. First, I used direct information to identify credit constrained …rms, and found that approximately 14 percent of Vietnamese SMEs are …nancially constrained. Removal of this constraint was estimated to increase external debt by around 7 percent on average. At a …rst glance this might seem as a relatively small e¤ect. However for the constrained group a removal of constraints would boost liabilities by around 34 percent. Second, I analysed …rms, which get access to credit, and examined the empirical determinants of credit availability and the interest rate on the most recent loan. The analysis demonstrated that: a) Larger …rms get cheaper credit. b) Informal credit markets play an important role for fast growing …rms, suggesting that enterprises may not have the time to go through administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if they want to "seize the day". c) While the probability of accessing credit is higher in rural areas, rural …rms experience at the same time larger credit constraints, indicating that demand for external funds is signi…cantly higher in rural areas than in the larger urban cities. d) Non-household enterprises often face larger credit constraints, suggesting that a shift in policy focus from the smaller household …rms towards supporting larger private and limited liability companies is needed. e) Borrowerlender relationships reduce interest rates, indicating that relationship lending gives important information about borrower quality in the segmented Vietnamese credit market. f) Finally, collateralized loans face larger interest rates, explained by the signi…cant in ‡uence of "policy lending" in Vietnamese credit markets.
